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PROPERTY
DAVID H. MEANS*
Adverse Possession
The facts in Crotwell v. Whitney' suggest, but make it un-
necessary to answer, adverse possession questions as yet not
expressly decided in South Carolina. The rule in this State,
contrary to the view of the overwhelming majority of juris-
dictions, is that even though there be privity by deed or de-
vise between successive adverse occupants of land, the posses-
sion of such occupants cannot be tacked to make out title by
adverse possession under the statute of limitations.2 Such
tacking has been permitted, however, in the case of a continua-
tion by the heir of the possession of the ancestor dying in-
testate.3 Whether further exceptions to the no-tacking rule
will be permitted remains to be decided.
4
In the Crotwell case defendant's remote grantor purchased
at a tax sale the interest in land of a life tenant.5 Fifteen
*Professor of Law, University of South Carolina.
1. 229 S. C. 213, 92 S. E. 2d 473 (1956).
2. Crotwell v. Whitney, supra note 1, and the cases therein cited.
For the rule of most jurisdictions, see 4 TiFFANY, RmAL PRoPERTY § 1146
(1939). If the adverse claimant is asserting title under the twenty year
common law presumption of a grant the South Carolina cases do permit
tacking. Thomson v. Peake, 7 Rich. 353 (1854); Sutton v. Clarke, 59
S. C. 440, 38 S. E. 150 (1901). See Haithcock v. Haithcock, 123 S. C.
61, 68, 115 S. E. 727 (1923). Likewise, the forty year statute (§ 10-129)
permits a "possession ... sole or connected ... ". See Sutton v. Clarke,
supra.
3. Epperson v. Stansill, 64 S. C. 485, 42 S. E. 426 (1902). The ra-
tionale is that while the new entry of a purchaser by deed or devise
breaks the continuity of adverse possession, the heir is in of the ances-
tor's possession by operation of law.
4. It would seem that by operation of the doctrine of worthier title,
tacking should be permitted when the devise is to the heir of the testator.
See the authorities collected in Means, Words of Inheritance in Deeds
of Land in South Carolina, 5 S. C. L. Q. 313, 355, note 152 (1953).
But of. Burnett v. Crawford, 50 S. C. 161, 27 S. E. 645 (1897), wherein
the problem seems not to have been properly presented to the Court.
5. Defendant's contention that the tax debtor owned the land in fee
simple rather than for life was found without merit. In so concluding
the Court applied the incorporation by reference doctrine to embody
within the deed to the tax debtor the terms of a devise. Incidentally,
this devise contains no words of inheritance, nor does the Court's opin-
ion disclose that such words were in the deed in question. Whether the
incorporation by reference of a devise without words of inheritance is
sufficient to supply their omission in a deed is doubtful. See Means,
Words of Inheritance in Deeds of Land in South Carolina, 5 S. C. L. Q.
313, 321 note 30 (1953). The problem seems immaterial in the instant
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years after the death of the life tenant the remaindermen,
who were under no disability when their action accrued at
the life tenant's death, sued defendant to recover the land.
Defendant, who had been conveyed the purported legal title
within eight years prior to the suit, sought to tack his grant-
or's possession and thus establish title by adverse possession
under the ten year statute of limitations.
Defendant advanced two theories to escape the South Caro-
lina no-tacking rule. First, that both defendant and his
grantor held the land as trustees under a secret trust, and
that as successor trustee under the trust he should be per-
mitted to tack the possession of the prior trustee. Second,
that the equitable interest in the alleged secret trust having
continued for more than ten years in the original beneficiary
and his heirs by descent, the equitable interests of ancestor
and heir might be tacked and adverse possession thereby es-
tablished.
In affirming judgment for plaintiff remaindermen the
Supreme Court indicated that policywise it did not favor
plaintiff's argument that the tacking of equitable interests
under a secret trust should be permitted. Basis for the de-
cision, however, is that the evidence did not establish either
that defendant and his grantor held title as trustees -rather
than beneficially, or that the alleged equitable interest had
passed by descent rather than by purchase. Nevertheless,
even assuming that the Court had found the facts to be
as defendant alleged them, it is difficult to see how, under the
logic of the South Carolina cases, tacking of the possessions
of defendant and his grantor could have been permitted.6
case, however, as the deed was executed pursuant to court order. Gfh
Carolina Savings Bank v. McMahon, 37 S. C. 309, 16 S. E. 31 (1892);
Sumter Fertilizer Co. v. Baker, 206 S. C. 446, 34 S. E. 2d 681 (1945).
6. Basic principle of the trust concept, whether the trust be secret
or overt, is that while the equitable interest is in the beneficiary, ther
trustee has legal title to the land or chattel which is the subject matter
of the trust. Neel v. Clark, 193 S. C. 412, 8 S. E. 2d 740 (1940).
RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS, § 2; ScoTT, TRUSTS, § 2.3 (2d ed.). Since he
represents the legal title, the trustee must sue in trespass or ejeetment.
Among other cases, see Posey v. Cook, 1 Hill 413 (1833); Ayer v. Ritter,
29 S. C. 135, 7 S. E. 53 (1888); Epworth Orphanage v. Long, 199 S. C.
385, 19 S. E. 2d 481 (1942). Likewise, if the trustee is barred by the
statute of limitations the beneficiary is also barred, despite the fact
that he is under a disability, or that he has only an interest in remain-
der after the death of a still living equitable life tenant. Among other
cases, see Pope v. Patterson, 78 S. C. 334, 58 S. E. 945 (1907) ; Young
v. McNeil, 78 S. C. 143, 59 S. E. 986 (1907); Wells v. Coursey, 197
2
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Cancellation of Deeds
Cox v. Tanner,7 a case concerned with the effect on a con-
veyance by deed of a subsequent corrective deed executed by
grantor to grantee, already has been the subject of a case note
in the South Carolina Law Quarterly,s to which the reader
is referred for a more detailed discussion. The facts were
that land was conveyed to a husband alone by deed which
was recorded. Thereafter the husband had the grantor exe-
cute to the grantee and his wife a second deed bearing on
the back thereof the notation, "This is a correction Deed to
take the place of a Deed [referring to the record of the prior
deed]." The Court found the evidence to establish that the
first deed had been made to the husband alone through error,
and that the second deed unquestionably effectuated the in-
tention of the parties. Later the wife died, devising all of
her property to her husband for life, with remainder to her
sisters. Upon the husband's death the wife's sisters sued for
a determination that they owned one half of the land as ten-
ants in common with the heir of the deceased husband, who
denied their interest therein.
In affirming judgment for the plaintiffs, sisters of the
wife, the Court adopted as its opinion the order of the circuit
judge. The first deed was "given its full effect of taking
the place of the prior deed . . . and the first deed is can-
S. C. 483, 15 S. E. 2d 752 (1941). See BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES
§954 (1948).
Necessarily a transfer from trustee to successor trustee, whether
by court order or by deed, devise, or descent, involves a transfer of the
legal title. This being so, it follows under the South Carolina view that
unless the transfer takes place by descent from ancestor to heir, the
new entry of the successor trustee breaks the continuity of the adverse
possession. See notes 2, 3, supra. This would be true, it seems, despite
the fact that the equitable interest continued in the same beneficiary.
On the other hand, it appears that tacking the trustee's possession with
that of his common law heir as successor trustee by descent would be
permitted. Note 3, supra. [In South Carolina descent of the trustee's
title is to the common law heir rather than the statutory heirs. Cone v.
Cone, 61 S. C. 512, 39 S. E. 478 (1901) ; Karesh, Devolution of Interests
in Trust Estates, 1 S. C. L. Q. 367, 397 (1949)]. Conversely, if the same
party continued as trustee a transfer of the equitable interest would
not break the continuity of the trustee's adverse possession.
Assuming that an adverse occupancy by a trustee has resulted in the
acquisition of title by adverse possession, a further and most difficult
question is whether the title thus acquired is held by the trustee in
his own right, or in trust for the beneficiary. See Ballentine, 28 Yale
L. J. 488, 606 (1919); BOGERT, TRUSTS & TRUSTEES, § 143 (1951). Cf.
Anderson v. Rhodus, 12 Rich. Eq. 104 (1860).
7. 229 S. C. 568, 93 S. E. 2d 905 (1956).
8. 9 S. C. L. Q. 483 (1957).
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celled and rescinded by operation of the agreement and in-
tention of the parties themselves."
Estoppel en pais
McCauley v. Howard9 is a case in which the trial court
and the appellate court differed as to the possible applica-
bility of the doctrine of equitable estoppeL The facts were
that appellant's father died testate in 1944, devising a num-
ber of lots, including lot 18, to appellant, and other lots in
close proximity thereto to appellant's brother. Upon the
father's death the brother went into possession of lot 18,
on which there was a dwelling, and continued his possession
until 1948, when he sold and conveyed it to respondents, his
tenants in possession, who purchased without an investiga-
tion of the title. Subsequent to their purchase respondents
expended additional sums in making improvements. In 1954
appellant discovered that the lot which her brother had con-
veyed to respondents actually was situate within the area
devised to appellant, whereupon she brought suit for pos-
session.
On the trial the circuit judge ruled that appellant had title
to the property if she had not lost it by estoppel, which issue
he submitted to the jury.10 The Supreme Court disagreed
with this ruling and stated that there was "a total lack of
any testimony to the effect that respondents relied on any
representation, acts or nonacts of appellant or were misled
in any way to change their position to their prejudice. Re-
spondents did not have the title to the property investigated;
had they done so they would have learned that the lot in
question was devised to appellant . . . and that [appellant's
brother] had no interest therein." The Court's conclusion
that the evidence did not establish an estoppel seems sound.
Since appellant had not raised at the trial the question
of her right to recover the rental value from respondents,
the Court would not consider it on appeal. The lower court's
judgment on a verdict for respondents was reversed, and the
9. 230 S. C. 140, 94 S. E. 2d 393 (1956).
10. Piedmont and Northern Ry. v. Henderson, 216 S. C. 98, 56 S. E.
2d 740 (1949), although factually distinguishable, would seem to lend
support to the trial judge's ruling. The opinion in McCauley v. Howard
makes no reference to the Henderson Case, however. The question is a
complex one, but it may be that both the result and rationale of the Mc-
Cauley Case conflict with the decision in Piedmont & Northern Ry. v.
Henderson.
1957]
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case remanded for a determination of the amount respond-
ents were to be reimbursed for expenditures for taxes, in-
surance and improvements.
Judicial Sales - Setting Aside
In Re Paslay's Appeal" involves an attempt to set aside
a judicial sale. At a partition sale of land owned by respond-
ents, appellant, the only bidder, purchased the land for
$450.00. Thereafter the circuit judge, on respondents' peti-
tion, restrained the master from conveying to appellant and
required appellant to show cause why the restraining order
should not be made permanent and the property resold. Alle-
gations of respondents' verified petition were to the effect
that respondents had been prepared through their attorney
to bid $1,000.00 or more upon the sale, but that because of
a mechanical failure of the automobile of respondents' attor-
ney, the attorney had not arrived in time to make such bid
for respondents. The petition further alleged that the prop-
erty was worth one thousand dollars or more, and had a
rental value of at least thirty dollars a month, and that con-
summation of the sale would result in irreparable loss to re-
spondents.
Upon hearing appellant's return to the rule, the circuit
judge refused to dissolve the restraining order, and referred
the matter to have testimony taken as to the value of the
property and the adequacy of the sales price.
On appeal the circuit court was reversed, the Supreme
Court ruling that the injunction had been improvidently is-
sued, and that respondents' petition should have been dis-
missed. The fact that respondents' attorney was unable to
attend the sale because his automobile broke down was in-
sufficient to justify setting aside the sale. As to the alleged
inadequacy of price the Court said "it is well settled that
mere inadequacy of price (unless it shock the conscience of
the court) will not vitiate a judicial sale, in the absence of
other factors for which the selling officer or the successful
bidder was at least in part responsible, or participated." In
the instant case no such factors were present, nor did the
disparity between sales price and value shock the conscience
of the Court. The opinion contains a detailed review of the
South Carolina cases.
11. 230 S. C. 55, 94 S. E. 2d 57 (1956).
[Vol. 10
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Obstruction of a Public Way as a Private Nuisance
In Huggin v. Gaffney Development Co.12 the Court again 13
vindicates the right of a private citizen to sue for the ob-
struction of a public way. Damages and injunctive relief
were sought in a complaint which alleged that a road con-
necting two state highways ran through lands of both plain-
tiff and defendant; that by reason of defendant's obstruction
of the road plaintiff was denied access to state highway
number eleven, and as a consequence was unable to procure
farm labor and suffered a crop loss; also, that the closing of
the road depreciated the value of plaintiff's property.
In reversing a circuit court order sustaining a demurrer
to the complaint the Court said, "While ordinarily an indict-
ment is the remedy for obstruction of a public highway, it
is well settled 'that a private citizen may maintain a civil
action for damages or abatement with respect to a public
nuisance upon allegation and proof of such obstruction and
of direct and special damages resulting to him, different in
kind from what the public may sustain."' The Court found
the complaint to allege damages different in kind and degree
from that suffered by the public generally. The Court fur-
ther held that plaintiff's right to sue did not depend upon
proof that he had made demand upon the public authorities
for removal of the obstruction. Nor was there a defect of
parties because plaintiff had not joined the owners of other
property fronting on the road.
Specific Performance of Contract for Sale of Land
Butler v. Schilletter14 involves a suit for specific perform-
ance of a contract to sell land and for damages sustained by
reason of the vendor's refusal to convey. The vendor's an-
swer admitted the contract alleged in the complaint and pay-
ment of the purchase price, but further alleged that the vendor
would convey only if certain restrictions which should have
been included in the contract were incorporated in the deed.
The Supreme Court held that the circuit judge properly
refused to require the plaintiff to elect between a suit for
specific performance and an action at law for damages. Plain-
tiff's suit was for specific performance, but in such suit
he could recover special damages suffered as a result of the
12. 229 S. C. 340, 92 S. E. 2d 833 (1956).
13. A number of earlier cases are cited.
14. 230 S. C. 552, 96 S. E. 2d 661 (1957).
19571
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defendant's refusal to convey. Moreover, the circuit judge
properly struck from the answer allegations as to restric-
tions not in the contract. The answer did not allege the land
to be in a subdivision subject to recorded restrictions, nor did
the defendant plead fraud, accident or mutual mistake. There-
fore the written contract merged all prior negotiations and
rendered inadmissible testimony to vary or contradict its
terms. However, though the summary order for specific per-
formance was proper, there was error in the refusal to permit
the vendor's wife (who had been joined to bar her inchoate
right of dower) to answer after overruling her demurrer to
the complaint. Nor should the order have provided for a de-
posit with the Clerk of Court of the amount representing the
value of the wife's inchoate dower interest. Such provision
was premature, sifice after a hearing to determine the value of
the dower interest the alternative method of securing such
interest by a bond and mortgage on the land, as discussed
in Holly Hill Lumber Co. v. McCoy,15 might be preferable.
As thus modified the circuit decree was affirmed.
Suit to Quiet Title
The general rule' that a claimant of legal title to land
must be in possession when suing in equity to remove cloud
on his title was applied to dispose of plaintiff's appeal in
Priester v. Brabham,17 an action to set aside a tax deed. The
complaint of the plaintiffs, who were out of possession, was
construed by the circuit judge to state only a cause of action
for removal of cloud on title. On appeal the Court held that
plaintiffs not having excepted to this ruling of the circuit
judge, it became the law of the case. Therefore, the circuit
decree dismissing the complaint was affirmed without a con-
sideration of plaintiffs' exceptions.
Personal Property
Three cases falling within the personal property classifica-
tion were decided during the survey period. One, Grant v.
Clinkscales,' involved an action by a conditional vendee
against his vendor for conversion of a television set. On ap-
peal the evidence was held sufficient to sustain the jury's
15. 205 S. C. 60, 30 S. E. 2d 856 (1944).
16. Pollitzer v. Beinkemper, 76 S. C. 517, 57 S. E. 475 (1907); Morris
v. Lambert, 218 S. C. 384, 62 S. E. 2d 841 (1950).
17. 230 S. C. 201, 95 S. E. 2d 167 (1956).
18. 230 S. C. 416, 95 S. E. 2d 854 (1957).
[Vol. 10
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verdict for plaintiff in amount of $500.00 actual and $1,000.00
punitive damages.
The question presented in Washington v. Western Auto
Supply Co.19 is whether a judgment for the defendant in a
claim and delivery action in which plaintiff took possession
of the property precludes a subsequent independent action for
damages by defendant for plaintiff's unlawful taking and
detention.
The facts were that respondent, Western Auto Supply Co.,
in a claim and delivery action against appellant, Helen Wash-
ington, had posted bond and taken possession of personal
property which was subject to chattel mortgages in default.
Appellant's answer admitted the execution of the mortgages
and the balance due thereon, but alleged that respondent had
agreed to extend time for payment. Prayer of the answer
was for return of the property or judgment for its value
in case return could not be had, together with actual and
punitive damages for the wrongful taking and detention.
On motion of respondent the trial judge struck from the
answer the prayer for damages on the ground that the an-
swer did not contain a counterclaim. The trial resulted in
a verdict for appellant for possession of the property or its
value, $400.00, if possession could not be had. Respondent
appealed to the Court of Common Pleas, but the judgment of
the trial court (Civil and Criminal Court of Charleston) was
affirmed. Appellant did not appeal from the rulings by the
trial judge.
Appellant then brought the present action to recover actual
and punitive damages for the wrongful taking and detention
of the property, her complaint alleging respondent's non-
payment of the judgment and refusal to return the property.
Respondent demurred to the complaint for failure to state a
cause of action in that the former judgment was conclusive
of the matter. The trial judge overruled the demurrer, but
on appeal he was reversed by the circuit judge.
On appeal the Supreme Court affirmed the circuit judge's
order sustaining the demurrer. While recognizing that the
cases from other jurisdictions are conflicting, the Court
found the South Carolina Statutes 9a "to contemplate the set-
19. 230 S. C. 424, 96 S. E. 2d 63 (1957).
19a. Code of Laws of South Carolina, 1952 §§ 10-1453, 10-2516.
1957]
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tlement in one suit of all questions that might arise out of
the unlawful taking or detention of the property and not a
splitting of the cause of action for wrongful taking."
Appellant contended that since she had sought to adjudicate
her claim for damages in the prior suit but had been pre-
vented from doing so by respondent's motion to strike, re-
spondent was now estopped to deny appellant's right to main-
tain the present action. This contention the Court found with-
out merit, since assuming that the trial judge erred in refus-
ing to submit to the jury the issue of damages, appellant's
remedy was an appeal from the judgment rendered.
The Court found it unnecessary to decide appellant's con-
tention that the present action was not barred by the prior
judgment because it was a claim for damages for respond-
ent's retention of the property subsequent to the judgment
in claim and delivery. This was because in the claim and
delivery action appellant had not entered judgment in the
alternative for possession of the property or its value in
case delivery could not be had, but had entered an uncondi-
tional money judgment. In accord with cited earlier cases this
was held to waive appellant's right to the return of the prop-
erty and entitle her only to payment of the amount of the
judgment with interest and costs.
Whether sums paid to and on behalf of a widow by her step-
sons were gifts or loans was one of the questions raised in
Meyerson v. Malinow.20 Although the testimony was conflict-
ing, the master ruled that the sums paid had been intended
as gifts, and this ruling was concurred in by the county
judge. In affirming judgment on appeal, the Supreme Court
invoked the rule that in an equity case findings of fact by a
master which are concurred in by the county or circuit judge
will not be disturbed unless "such findings are without any
evidence to support them or are against the clear preponder-
ance of the evidence." Other issues in the case are discussed
in the survey of wills.
Cases Omitted
Several cases more appropriately classified in other sec-
tions of the annual survey have been omitted from the prop-
erty section. One,21 which is treated in the survey of secur-
20. 231 S. C. 14, 97 S. E. 2d 88 (1957).
21. Watson v. Little, 229 S. C. 486, 93 S. E. 2d 645 (1956).
[Vol. 10
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ity transactions, is concerned primarily with the right of a
mortgagee of land in possession, when an accounting is sought
by the mortgagor, to offset the mortgage indebtedness despite
the fact that the statute of limitations has run on the debt.
Another case,22 which involves an invalid town ordinance re-
quiring all businesses to close at midnight, is discussed in the
public corporations survey. Also included in the public cor-
porations survey is Stevenson v. Board of Adjustment,2 3 a
case concerned with the grant of a variance from the terms
of a municipal zoning ordinance.
Legislation
Sole property legislation within the survey period is an
Act 24 approved July 1, 1957, providing for the registration
of titles to motor vehicles. This Act, which is a modified
version of a model act, is to take effect on January 1, 1958.
For a discussion of certain of its features see the survey of
security transactions.
Tangential to the property classification are two Acts, 25
approved June 18, 20, 1957, providing for an extension of the
existing tax liens on personal property. These acts are more
fully discussed in the survey of taxation.
22. Painter v. Town of Forest Acres, 231 S. C. 56, 97 S. E. 2d 71
(1957).
23. 230 S. C. 440, 96 S. E. 2d 456 (1957).
24. Acts 1957, No. 402.
25. Acts 1957, Nos. 368, 404.
19571
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